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CASE NOTES
2) they might construe the language of the Code to fit as many cases as
possible into the "excepted" classification of section 2-318, by loosely inter-
preting "buyer," thereby achieving simply a more confused version of
the first alternative; or 3) they might work to revise the Code to bring
it into line with the national trend. Pennsylvania, it would appear, has
taken the second of these alternatives.
Quintin Sanhamel
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF PRESS-MISSTATE-
MENT OF FACT HELD PRIVILEGED IN LIBEL
ACTION BY PUBLIC OFFICIAL
The petitioner, "New York Times," published a paid political advertise-
ment attacking segregationist activity in the South and requesting contri-
butions to fight segregation. It is uncontroverted that some of the state-
ments contained in the advertisement were false. No one was specifically
mentioned, but the respondent, police commissioner, charged libel by in-
nuendo and sued the "New York Times." The trial judge instructed the
jury that the statements made were libelous per se.1 The question of
whether the innuendos were strong enough to implicate the police com-
missioner in the minds of the reading public was left to the jury. A verdict
of $500,000 was returned against the defendants. The Supreme Court of
Alabama affirmed the judgment.2 The United States Supreme Court held
that the first and fourteenth amendments require that a public official, in
order to recover for a defamatory falsehood, must prove that the statement
was made with actual malice. There being no evidence of actual malice
present in the case, the Supreme Court reversed. The two concurring
opinions3 argued in favor of an absolute privilege of free press, and thus
would extend the protection of the press even beyond that which the ma-
jority opinion had conditioned on the lack of actual malice. New York
Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Prior to this case, the guarantee of the first amendment had never im-
munized the press from subsequent liability for false and damaging state-
ments.4 Previously, the extent of the liability of the press depended upon
1 ALA. CODE tit. 7, §§ 908 & 914 (1940). Libel per se signifies either that the words
are defamatory on their face or that they are actionable without proof of damage.
PROSSER, TORTS § 93, p. 588 (2d ed. 1955).
2 New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 565, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962).
3 Black, J., joined by Douglas, J. and Goldberg, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurred
in the result in separate opinions.
4 The right of the press to invoke privilege where the publication in question contains
a misstatement of fact has been a controversial subject, the decisions of the various
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balancing the right of an individual to an unblemished reputation and the
need for frank discussion of important topics.5 In the instant case, it is
alarming that there is a total absence of balancing in regard to the conflict-
ing rights present.6
No one would question the importance of an "unfettered interchange
of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people." 7 But as important as freedom of speech is, it should not be
allowed to encroach upon rights which are as fully and equally en-
shrined in the Constitution." The problem is ably expressed by Judge
jurisdictions not being in accord. See, e.g., Parsons v. Age-Herald Publishing Co., 181
Ala. 439, 61 So. 345 (1913). Contra, Coleman v. MacLennon, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281
(1908). But the majority of the courts defined freedom of the press as a "freedom
to tell the truth and comment fairly on facts and not a license to spread damaging
falsehoods in the guise of news gathering and its dissemination." Sweeney v. Schenec-
tady Union Publishing Co., 122 F.2d 288, 291 (C.A. 2, 1941). See also Note, Libel
Actions Brought by Public Officials, 51 YALE L.J. 693 (1942).
5 Pennekamp v. State of Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
The best illustration of the balancing concept in operation is the clear and present
danger rule. According to this rule, the government is only allowed to take corrective
action against the press if, under the circumstances, the words create a "clear and
present danger that they (the words) will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
By use of the clear and present danger rule, freedom of the press has been curbed
if its exercise would do serious political, economic or moral injury to the government,
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); would impede it in the performance of
its governmental duties, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); or would endanger
the foundations of organized government, Whitney v. California, supra. The rule
has been applied most consistently in cases where the press was charged with ob-
structing an individual's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. Wood v. Georgia,
370 U.S. 375 (1962).
6 The Supreme Court saw the problem purely in terms of the free press, stating that
if newspapers are liable for misstatements of fact, they "may be deterred from voicing
their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true,
because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having
to do so." New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
7 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); quoted with approval by the
Court in New York Times, supra note 6, at 269.
8 "A free press is vital to a democratic society because its freedom gives power.
Power in a democracy implies responsibility in its exercise. No institution in a democ-
racy, either governmental or private, can have absolute power .... In plain English,
freedom carries responsibility even for the press; freedom of the press is not a free-
dom from responsibility for its exercise .... That there was such legal liability was so
taken for granted by the framers of the First Amendment that it was not spelled out.
Responsibility for its abuse was imbedded in the law. The First Amendment safeguarded
the right." Pennekamp v. Florida, supra note 5, at 355-56.
For practical application of the first amendment, it is interesting to note that while
the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 guaranteed free speech, there are records of
at least three convictions of political libels. DUNWAY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, (MAsSACHU-
sETTs) 144-46, referred to by Justice Frankfurter in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 521 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
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Hubert L. Will of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois.
There is an inevitable overlapping of and competition between protected rights,
out of which some accommodation in reason and policy must be reached in
order that one not be largely sacrificed for the sake of preserving another.9
In New York Times, the Court was presented with various privileges
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, none of which was entirely unlimited,
unqualified or unrelated, that is, the right of the press to freedom, the
right of an individual to his reputation and the right of the public to
secure accurate news. In order to give each of these rights its due and
yet not adversely affect the other, a process of balancing should have been
employed.' 0
A newspaper's privilege in a political libel suit is justified because a
public official has ready access to the press, and, as the Court points out,"
special immunity from liability for his own utterances. 12 In the past, the
principal limitations on the privilege accorded the newspapers were that
the statements be within the bounds of fair comment 3 and not motivated
by actual malice.14 The Court, in the instant case, enlarged the privilege
of the press by giving it immunity as to misstatements of fact in regard
to public officials. In so doing, the Court is according freedom of the
press an unnecessary position of dominance over other rights equally
secured by the Bill of Rights.15
9 WILL, Free Press vs. Fair Trial, 12 DEPAUL L. ]Ev. 197, 200 (1963).
10 "It is imperative that, when the effective exercise of these rights (freedom of the
press) is claimed to be abridged, the courts should 'weigh the circumstances' and
,appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced' in support of the challenged regu-
lations." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 96 (194)).
11 New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964).
l2 The purpose of the official's immunity was expiessed by Learned Hand, J., "In this
instance it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done
by dishonest officers than to subject those who try, to do their duty to the constant
dread of retaliation." Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (C.A. 2, 1949). Accord,
Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
It is interesting to note that Justice Douglas, who now concurs with the absolutist
view of the concurring opinions, joined in a strong dissent against the absolute privilege
as applied to a public official, stating that the privilege "has not given even the slightest
consideration to the interest of the individual who is defamed. It is a complete anni-
hilation of his interest." Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 578 (1959).
13 The defense of fair comment was designed to permit freedom of criticism and
opinion rather than misstatements of fact. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 606 (1938). See gen-
erally, YANKWICn, Protection of Newspaper Comment, 11 LA. L. REV. 327 (1951).
14 That is to say the court will look to the primary motive or purpose by which the
defendant apparently is inspired. If the defendan.: acts chiefly from motives of ill
will, he is given no immunity. PROSSER, TORTS § 95 (2d ed. 1955).
15 For an examination of the danger of giving a non-essential privilege to the press,
see NADELMANN, The Newspaper Privilege and Exiortion by Abuse of Legal Process,
54 COLUM. L. REv. 359 (1954).
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The dilemma into which the public official is placed by this decision
is very aptly expressed by the Chief Justice, then Judge Taft, when he
wrote:
If the privilege is to extend to cases like that at bar, then a man who offers
himself as a candidate must submit uncomplainingly to the loss of his repu-
tation not with a single person or a small class of persons, but with every
member of the public, whenever an untrue charge of disgraceful conduct is
made against him, if only his accuser honestly believes the charge upon rea-
sonable ground. We think that not only is such a sacrifice not required of
everyone who consents to become a candidate for office, but that to sanction
such a doctrine would do the public more harm than good.1
That the public official will sustain serious harm from the Court's ruling
is evident. The press, because it will not now have to respond in damages
for misstatement of fact, is discharged from responsibility. But, this ex-
tension of privilege does not advance the spirit of the first amendment,
namely, that of fostering freedom of discussion. When based upon in-
accurate facts, a discussion confuses rather than enlightens-this can
hardly be what the framers of the Bill of Rights envisioned in formulat-
ing the first amendment.' 7 It appears, therefore, that the only reason for
imposing this hardship on public officials is to save newspapers from the
necessity of having to "check the facts" before printing.' 8 For the Court
to hold a public official's reputation in less esteem than the press' freedom
from "checking the facts" indicates a failure to properly weigh the rights
involved.
Freedom of the press is designed primarily to encourage the democratic
16 Post Publishing Company v. Hallam, 59 F. 530, 540 (C.A. 6, 1893).
Courts have considered publications libelous even if they were not believed in the
community. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); aff'd,
223 F.2d 429 (C.A. 2, 1955); cert. denied, Pegler v. Reynolds, 350 U.S. 846 (1955):
"A person may be of such high character that the grossest libel would damage him
none; but that would be no reason for withdrawing his case from the wholesome,
if not necessary, rule in respect of punitive damages." See also the dissent of Justices
Frankfurter, Harlan, Whittaker and Stewart which criticizes the unfairness of de-
priving a defamed individual recovery against the press-the agency by which the
defamatory communication was magnified. Farmers Educational & Co-op Union v.
W.D.A.Y. Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
17 "Freedom of discussion and freedom of the press under the guidance and sanction
of truth, are essential to the liberties of our country, and to enable the people to
select their rulers with discretion, and to judge correctly of their merits." People v.
Croswell, 1 N.Y. (3 Johns) 717, 719 (1804). Discussion serves as a corrective force
to political, economic and other influences which are inevitably present in matters of
public concern. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
18 Zechariah Chaffee, Jr., a devoted exponent of free speech and press, quoted with
approval "'Newspaper slips are usually the result of reprehensible conduct of members
of the defendant's organization . . . the tendency towards flamboyance and haste in
modern journalism should be checked rather than countenanced.'" CHAFFEE, Possible
New Remedies for Errors in the Press, 60 HARV. L. REv. 1, 23 (1946), quoting MoRis,
Inadvertent Newspaper Libel and Retraction, 32 ILL. L. REv. 36, 44-45, n. 25 (1937).
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process by allowing the public access to in formation about their govern-
ment and their governmental officials, thus ensuring an informed voting
public. 19 Freedom of the press, therefore, is of paramount concern to
the public as it has a vested interest in being certain that it is not de-
ceived or misled by the press on which it ielies. It is difficult to see how
the public interest is being served by sanctioning the press in its printing
of misstatements of fact about a public official. If a news item concerning
a public official had to be delayed until an afternoon or evening edition
because the newspapers had to "check the facts" to see that there were
no misstatements, it certainly would not harm the public. Quite the
contrary, it would more adequately promote the spirit of the first
amendment in that it would foster truth, thus giving the public accurate
facts upon which to base valid judgments. Justice, then Judge Holmes,
in upholding a trial court's charge to the jury that a newspaper's state-
ments of fact, if false, were not privileged, stated the public's viewpoint
succinctly:
But what the interest of private citizens in public matters requires is freedom
of discussion rather than of statement....
If one private citizen wrote to another that a high official had taken a bribe,
no one would think good faith a sufficient answer to an action. He stands no
better, certainly, when he publishes his writing to the world through a news-
paper, and the paper itself stands no better than the writer.
20
Nowhere does the Court mention this conflict between the prerogative
of the press to disseminate news and the interest of the public in securing
the truth. Balancing of rights, if used in this instance, would have given
the public its proper protection.
The concurring opinions take a completely absolutist view of the
first amendment, stating that a public official should not be able to sue
19 See CONOVER, Free Speech and the Common Good, 46 MARQ. L. REv. 79 (1962).
"Punitive or exemplary damages are intended to act as a deterrent upon the libelor
so that he will not repeat the offense, and to serve a:; a warning to others.... They are
intended as punishment for gross misbehavior for the good of the public and have
been referred to as 'a sort of hybrid between a display of ethical indignation and the
imposition of a criminal fine.'... Punitive damages are allowed on the ground of public
policy and not because the plaintiff has suffered any monetary damages for which
he is entitled to reimbursement; the award goes to him simply because it is assessed
in his particular suit .... The damages may be considered expressive of the community
attitude toward one who wilfully and wantonly causes hurt or injury to another."
Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp 36, 38 (1954); aff'd, 223 F.2d 429 (C.A. 2, 1955); cert.
denied, Pegler v. Reynolds, 350 U.S. 846 (1955).
20 Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Company, 154 Mass. 238, 243, 28 N.E. 1, 4 (1891).
See also, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931): "But it is recognized that punishment
for the abuse of the liberty accorded to the press is essential to the protection of the
public, and that the common law rules that subject the libeler to responsibility for
the public offense, as well as for private injury, are not abolished by the protection
extended in our constitutions." Id. at 715.
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the press even for malicious misstatement of fact. Thus, even the mar-
ginal protection afforded by the majority opinion would be eliminated.
By this interpretation, free speech would take precedence over all other
rights. The sole reason for this pre-eminence seemingly is that the first
amendment contains the words "no abridgement." Both Justice Black's
21
and Justice Goldberg's opinions emphasize the fact that the first amend-
ment affords citizens an unconditional right to criticize public officials,
22
but both Justices refuse to delineate between criticism and defamatory
falsehood.2 3 The admonition of Mr. Justice Jackson seems more than
apropos:
There is a danger that, if the court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with
a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into
a suicide pact.24
The press must be kept by definite law, regulation or judicial decisions
within the confines of decency, honesty and justice. This can only be
accomplished by balancing various overlapping rights. Should one right
categorically outweigh another, both could eventually be lost. 25 The
21 Recent history proves that freedom of the press has been seen, by the Court itself,
through a prism reflecting a variety of meanings. Justice Black, who now believes in
a completely absolutist position, agreed with the majority opinion of the court in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), when it stated that the right
of free speech is not an absolute at all times and under all circumstances but that
there are well defined and narrowly limited classes of speech which can be prevented.
22 New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 295, 298 (1964) (concurring
opinions).
23 That is, comment or criticism as distinct from false aspersions cast on the characters
of officers. See GLEISSER, Newspaper Libel, 5 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 132 (1956) and
CAMPBELL, Libel as a Limitation on Newspaper Publications, 25 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 279
(1953).
24 Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
"Because freedom of public expression alone assures the unfolding of truth, it is
indispensable to the democratic process. But even that freedom is not an absolute
and is not predetermined. By a doctrinaire overstatement of its scope and by giving it
an illusory absolute appearance, there is danger of thwarting the free choice and the
responsibility of exercising it which are basic to a democratic society." Bridges v. Cali-
fornia, 314 U.S. 252, 293 (1941) (dissenting opinion of Justices Frankfurter, Roberts
and Byrnes).
25 This would be especially true if the future application of the Court's ruling is
broader than the terms in which it was expressed. The possibility of this is very real,
for the Court cited, with apparent approval, the language of Coleman v. MacLennon,
78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908). New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280
(1964). The Kansas court also required proof of actual malice before a public official
could sue a newspaper for libel. However, it added: "This privilege extends to a
great variety of subjects and includes matters of public concern, public men and
candidates for office." Id. at 723; Note, 9 VILL. L. REv. 534, 537 n.28 (1964). Newspapers,
before requesting still greater privilege should take heed of Tom Paine's words: "He
that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression;
for if he violates his duty he establishes a precedent that will reach himself." BROOKS,
THE WORLD OF WASHINGTON IRVING 73, quoted in Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 48
(1945).
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principal commendation of open balancing is that it "compels a judge
to take full responsibility for his decisions, and promises a particularized,
rational account of how he arrives at them--more particularized and more
rational at least than the familar parade of hallowed abstractions, elastic
absolutes, and selective history. '26 Open balancing would ensure the pro-
tection to the press and at the same time provide a safeguard against
the danger of allowing the press an inordinate amount of freedom. Essen-
tial protection would thus be afforded all rights embodied in the Con-
stitution. Therefore, it is hoped, that in deciding future free speech cases,
the Court will return to the use of the balancing concept.
Shelmerdeane Miller
26 MENELrisoN, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance,
50 CALIF. L. REv. 821, 828 (1962). Contra, FRANTZ, IS the First Amendment Law?-
A Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 729 (1963).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO COUNSEL-
WHEN DOES IT ACCRUE?
Danny Escobedo, a twenty-two-year-old resident of Chicago, was
arrested without a warrant about 8:00 Pv.M. on January 30, 1960, and
taken to a police station for interrogation about the murder of his brother-
in-law without formal charges being placed against him. The police told
him about an incriminating statement made by another suspect, and
urged him to admit the crime. Escobedo repeatedly requested to consult
with his attorney. The police answered that the lawyer did not want to
see him. About 11:00 P.M., Escobedo's lawyer, who had been trying to
meet with his client since 9:30 P.M., caught a glimpse of him, and they
exchanged waves before the lawyer was escorted away. Escobedo inter-
preted the wave as an instruction to keep quiet. Nevertheless, by midnight,
he made a statement incriminating himself in the crime.
At the trial, the state introduced the confession. A defense motion to
suppress it was overruled and Escobedo was convicted of murder. On
appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the judgment was reversed on the
ground that certain evidence tended to show that the statement had been
the result of a promise of immunity from prosecution by the state.' On
rehearing, the judgment was affirmed. 2 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and in a 5 to 4 opinion h.ld that Escobedo's right to
' People v. Escobedo, No. 36707, I., Feb. 1,. 1963 (copy on file in the library of the
Chicago Bar Association).
2 People v. Escobedo, 28 M1. 2d 41, 190 N.E.2d 825 (1963).
